In Israel, in Palestine, in our own country: what memories do we allow to shape our history, shape our identity, and then cycle back to create new memories? What memories do we co-opt as our own, from others’ testimonies, from history, from our identity? What memories, histories, and identities do we construct out of thin air?
This land is a land of vivid memories, dynamic and tangible history, and complicated, unceasing conflict. The Israeli national narrative is deeply ingrained in the minds of the Jewish Israelis living here. It is dream fed by memory, molded into movement, enacted by emigrants and refugees for decades prior to the establishment of Israel in 1948, and continued since. It is nightmare-dream/memory/myth become national narrative, become catalyst for events that have shaped history. Whether or not you buy into the narrative is irrelevant. The narrative has shaped history for the Israelis, and it will continue to do so.
A view of the security barrier from the on the way to Ramallah.
The Palestinian narrative has likewise shaped their history. It is, similarly, nightmare-dream/memory/ myth become the narrative of the nationalist aspirations of Palestine, and it shapes their history on the ground. Every event in the life of Palestine (and likewise of Israel) is perceived through the lens of the collective national memory and identity, and thus shapes their historiography (their writing of history) – and likewise the history-in-the-making on the ground. Again, whatever you might think about the narrative is irrelevant. The narrative is writing history.My thinking about this whole memory/history/identity cyclical process has matured in the past year and a half, since I first started working with the idea in the context of Moroccan identity politics. I still have a soft spot in my heart for the Berberist (Amazigh- indigenous) struggle and the narrative that they spout, but, in the end, their narrative developed just as did the Arabo-Islamist narrative that they are combating. My thesis argued in favor of the Berberist narrative, and concluded that it is in the interest of the West and particularly, America, to hear their narrative and value it over the Islamist one. In the end, though, both narratives developed by means of the same processes, and one is NOT better than the other and should NOT supersede the other. They both just are. It is how it is. The problem in Morocco and the problem in Israel and Palestine is that there is one narrative that is superseding the other narrative, one history and memory that oppresses the other (the Islamist in Morocco, and, arguably, the Israeli in this part of the world, but also, in certain ways, the Palestinian in the ability of Palestinian-born terrorists to hold the Israeli population hostage in immobilizing fear, and lead them to security measures such as the blockade of Gaza and the construction of the security barrier).
More graffiti on the Palestinian side of the wall The Israeli narrative is a valid narrative. The Palestinian narrative is a valid narrative. Both contain fact, fiction, reality and myth. The issue is not that one narrative must cease to exist (and a people and their identity with it) in favor of the other’s rise. The issue is when two peoples of distinct identities and narratives are in conflict, it is often because one is not being granted the right to self-determination in light of their narrative. This is, as I see it, exactly what is going on Israel-Palestine, and to a much lesser and much milder extent, in Morocco between the indigenous Berbers and the Arabs.
Looking into Beit Lehem (Bethlehem) and Beit Jala
Ok. So both the Israelis and the Palestinians deserve the right to self-determination. A no-brainer. A two-state solution is the most viable way to go – where Palestinians would have full and complete governance of their own state, existing peacefully beside Israel. The problem is, then, where the state is to be after the failure of the peace negotiations of the last decade. Here is where I have difficulty, and here is where you must spend considerable time learning about the failed Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David in summer 2000, and the later failed negotiations at Taba in January 2001. The blame is thrown at both sides: at Yasser Arafat because he rejected a very generous offer made by Ehud Barak, and at Israel because Israel didn’t concede enough, and back at the Palestinians because Israel maintains there was nothing more they could have reasonably given. And so it continues. (Read about the Clinton Parameters on Wikipedia. It’s truly a good, concise synopsis, and it will provide you with many links for further research).
We met with a senior Fatah official today at the Palestinian Authority headquarters in Ramallah (an experience that very very few Americans heavily emotionally invested in this conflict EVER get to have). The four-part demands of Fatah, as he repeatedly explained to us, are as follows:
1. Withdrawal from lands that exceed the pre-1967 borders of Israel, returning all the land outside of those borders to the Palestinian people for a Palestinian state. (This was effectively part of the Clinton Parameters accepted by Barak, and rejected by Arafat).
2. To give East Jerusalem – in its entirety (as defined by Fatah) – back to the Palestinians.
3. Remove illegal settlements in Palestinian territories, which he defined as settlements in that exceed the pre-1967 borders of Israel (this was addressed in the peace negotiations with proposed “land swaps” for Arab villages in the Israeli side with Jewish settlements in the Palestinian side)
4. Grant the option of the Right of Return to refugees and their descendants, or instead grant them monetary compensation for their losses (which has always been a demand of the Palestinians, and has always been refused by Israel)
Our group spent considerable time questioning him about the fourth demand, as this would mean at least hundreds of thousands (some estimates exceed millions) of people flooding into the land of Israel, effectively dismantling the demographics of the state and the existence of a Jewish state.
“With very minor exceptions, one through three have been granted and rejected twice by the Palestinians. Why do you say that Israel refuses to meet these parameters?”
“Because they were not offered to us in this way. This was not the offer made to us at Camp David or at Taba.”
A few more questions circled about this, and the response remained the same. The Wikipedia article touches on what he considered many of the problems: occupation of the Jordan Valley by Israeli forces (Wikipedia reads “international forces”), right of Israel to deploy troops in Palestine, etc.
“The Right of Return would be impossible for Israel to accept,” some of us mentioned.
“Israel won’t even meet one through three,” he said. “Israel must accept one through three, and then we can negotiate about number four. But one through three, they must accept.”
The whole talk left me feeling somewhat hopeless, and while this was perhaps lost in translation, his position, as I heard it, was one of intransigence. (Two things: first, he’s a politician, and politicians stick to their party line. Granted. From what I could see, he’s a very effective politician, and a good leader for his people. Second, I really loved being around Arabic speakers. I could catch at least a dozen words or phrases in every statement he made, and often derive some meaning from it. That was terribly exciting, and renewed my motivation to gain functional fluency in Arabic. So, while his position was hard to swallow at times, the whole experience was as enjoyable as this type of experience could be).
The Israeli and Palestinian narratives are nationalist narratives, and the Palestinians need their own state. The Israeli public (70% in a recent poll) have no argument there. They want Palestinians to have their own state. Two “however’s.” The first: However, the Palestinians have to get their act together (Hamas needs to stop terrorizing Fatah, and Fatah needs to stop terrorizing Hamas, responsible leaders need to be raised up and the widespread corruption in the Fatah government has to end). The second: However, those who support the creation of a Palestinian state – and I wholeheartedly do – have to also acknowledge the very valid security concerns of Israel. While the Fatah official with whom we met spoke to us primarily about territorial concerns and, I believe, yearns for negotiations and for peace, I pressed him on the issue of Hamas – which purports an religious extremism, historically has terrorized the Israelis living in towns bordering the Gaza strip, and has proclaimed its determination to destroy Israel. (Fatah also proclaims that they want an end to the Jewish state).
“You are speaking about territorial concerns, but what about Hamas? Hamas will not negotiate, and is determined to destroy Israel. How will peace come, even if Israel meets these demands, with Hamas determined to destroy Israel?” I asked.
He contended that if Israel would concede to the demands of Fatah, peace would come to the region and Hamas would cease its campaign of terror.
I wish, and I pray. Truly I do. But I don’t believe that religious extremists will stop if Israel were to make the territorial concessions that our Fatah official outlined. The motivation that drives Hamas’ fight supersedes the nationalist aspirations of Palestinians as outlined by Fatah. Hamas wants to end the existence of Israel.
The high-ranking IDF officer with whom we spoke yesterday in Sderot, on a hill overlooking the Gaza strip, told us, “There have been 10 million Qassam rockets launched into Israel since 2001.” The vast majority of these were fired into Israel from Gaza. He later added, “If you open the sea gates, within two months Hamas would have 40,000 rockets that could reach Tel Aviv.”
We hear these things and whether or not we believe them, whether or not we believe Israeli intelligence and the unclassified information being shared with us, we’re hearing part of the Israeli narrative that continues to feed their mindset, stoke the fire of their fears, and affects their actions on the ground.
And those of us stateside who are very passionate about this conflict, we HAVE to remember: There is no easy answer to the woes of all the people in this land, and there is no use to Westerners spouting one-sided, biased, bigoted, and proud analyses of this conflict. I’m guilty of this, and tonight, I will pray for forgiveness. I don’t live here. My family members haven’t been killed or maimed by suicide bombers. I have no iron key hanging on my wall that unlocks a long-lost door in a long-lost Arab neighborhood in what is now Israel.
My heart aches for the people affected by this conflict. I have no solution. American pro-Palestinian activists don’t have a solution, and neither do American pro-Israel lobbies.
We don’t live here. We don’t know what it’s like to feel that there is no other option than to construct a security barrier to prevent terrorists from entering our neighborhoods and blowing up buses outside our children’s kindergartens. And we don’t live next to walls that separate us from our family and friends living in Jerusalem, while we live just over the hill in Bethlehem.
I am convinced that no side is ultimately “right” while the other is “wrong.” Both have committed violence and unspeakable evil.
We can’t imagine what it’s like.
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